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Active Subspace of Neural Networks: Structural Analysis and Universal Attacks ∗
Chunfeng Cui† , Kaiqi Zhang† , Talgat Daulbaev‡ , Julia Gusak‡ ,
Ivan Oseledets§ , and Zheng Zhang†
Abstract. Active subspace is a model reduction method widely used in the uncertainty quantification commu-
nity. In this paper, we propose analyzing the internal structure and vulnerability and deep neural
networks using active subspace. Firstly, we employ the active subspace to measure the number of
“active neurons” at each intermediate layer, and reduce the number of neurons from several thou-
sands to several dozens. This motivates us to change the network structure and to develop a new
and more compact network, referred to as ASNet, that has significantly fewer model parameters.
Secondly, we propose analyzing the vulnerability of a neural network using active subspace and
finding an additive universal adversarial attack vector that can misclassify a dataset with a high
probability. Our experiments on CIFAR-10 show that ASNet can achieve 23.98× parameter and
7.30× flops reduction. The universal active subspace attack vector can achieve around 20% higher
attack ratio compared with the existing approach in all of our numerical experiments. The PyTorch
codes for this paper are available online 1.
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AMS subject classifications. 90C26, 15A18, 62G35
1. Introduction. Deep neural networks have achieved impressive performance in many
applications, such as computer vision [32], nature language processing [55], and speech recog-
nition [23]. Most neural networks use deep structure (i.e., many layers) and a huge number of
neurons to achieve a high accuracy and expressive power [41, 19]. However, it is still unclear
how many layers and neurons are necessary. Employing an unnecessarily complicated deep
neural network can cause huge extra costs in run-time and hardware resources. Driven by
resource-constrained applications such as robotics and internet of things, there is an increasing
interest in building smaller neural networks by removing network redundancy. Representa-
tive methods include network pruning and sharing [17, 25, 27, 36, 35], low-rank matrix and
tensor factorization [46, 26, 18, 33, 40], parameter quantization [12, 15], knowledge distilla-
tion [28, 43], and so forth. However, most existing methods delete model parameters directly
without changing the network architecture [27, 25, 7, 35].
Another important issue of deep neural networks is the lack of robustness. A deep neural
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network is desired to maintain a good performance for noisy or corrupted data in order to be
deployed in safety-critical applications such as autonomous driving and medical image analy-
sis. However, recent studies have revealed that many state-of-the-art deep neural networks are
vulnerable to small perturbations [51]. A substantial number of methods have been proposed
to generate adversarial examples. Representative works can be classified into four classes [49],
including optimization methods [8, 38, 37, 51], sensitive features [22, 42], geometric transfor-
mations [16, 31], and generative models [4]. However, these methods share a fundamental
limitation: each perturbation is designed for a given data point, and one has to implement
the algorithm again in order to generate the perturbation for a new data sample. Recently,
several methods have also been proposed to compute a universal adversarial attack in order to
fool a dataset simultaneously (rather than one data sample) in various applications, such as
computer vision [37], speech recognition [39], audio [1], and text classifier [5]. However, all the
above methods solve a series of data-dependent sub-problems. To our best knowledge, none
of the existing algorithms use the universal information extracted from the whole dataset.
This paper investigates the above two issues with the active subspace method [45, 9, 10]
that was originally developed for uncertainty quantification. The key idea of the active sub-
space is to identify the important directions of a multi-variable function, which can contribute
significantly to its variance. These directions are constructed by the principal components
of the uncentered covariance matrix of gradients instead of the nature coordinates in the pa-
rameter space. Afterwards, a response surface can be constructed in this low-dimensional
subspace to reduce the number of parameters for partial differential equations [10] and uncer-
tainty quantification [11]. However, the power of active subspace in analyzing and attacking
deep neural networks has not been explored.
1.1. Paper Contributions. The contribution of this manuscript is twofold.
• Firstly, we apply the active subspace to some intermediate layers of a deep neural network,
and try to answeri the following question: how many neurons and layers are important
in a deep neural network? Based on active subspace, we propose the definition of “active
neurons”. Fig. 1 (a) shows that even though there are tens of thousands of neurons, only
dozens of them are important from the active subspace point of view. Fig. 1 (b) further
shows that most of the neural network parameters are distributed in the last few layers.
This motivates us to cut off the tail layers and replace them with a smaller and simpler new
framework called ASNet. ASNet contains three parts: the first few layers of a deep neural
network, an active-subspace layer that maps the intermediate neurons to a low-dimensional
subspace, and a polynomial chaos expansion layer that projects the reduced variables to the
outputs. Our numerical experiments show that the proposed ASNet has much fewer model
parameters than the original one. The proposed ASNet can be combined with existing
structured re-training methods (e.g., pruning and quantization) to get better accuracy and
further fewer model parameters.
• Secondly, we uses active subspace to develop a new universal attack method to fool deep
neural network on a whole data set. We formulate this problem as a ball-constrained loss
maximization problem and propose a heuristic projected gradient descent algorithm to solve
it. At each iteration, the ascent direction is the dominant active subspace of the current
data points, and the stepsize is decided by the backtracking algorithm. Fig. 1 (c) shows
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Figure 1: Structural analysis of deep neural networks by the active subspace (AS). All experi-
ments are conducted on CIFAR-10 by VGG-19. (a) The number of neurons can be significantly
reduced by the active subspace; (b) Most of the parameters are distributed in the last few
layers; (c) The active subspace direction can perturb the network performance significantly.
that the testing accuracy of a deep neural network can decrease to around 20% when it is
fooled by our proposed approach.
The rest of this manuscript is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review the key idea of
active subspace. Based on the active-subspace method, Section 3 shows how to find the number
of active neurons in a deep neural network and further proposes a new and compact network,
referred to as ASNet. Section 4 develops a new universal adversarial attack method based on
active subspace. The numerical experiments for both ASNet and universal adversarial attacks
are presented in Section 5. Finally, we conclude this paper in Section 6.
2. Active Subspace. Active-subspace is an efficient tool for functional analysis and di-
mension reduction. Its key idea is to construct a low-dimensional subspace for the input
variables in which the function value changes dramatically. Given a continuous function f(x)
with x described by the probability density function ρ(x), one can construct an uncentered
covariance matrix for the gradient: C = E[∇f(x)∇f(x)T ]. Suppose the matrix C admits the
following eigenvalue decomposition,
(2.1) C = VΛVT ,
where V includes all orthogonal eigenvectors and
(2.2) Λ = diag(λ1, · · · , λn), λ1 ≥ · · · ≥ λn ≥ 0
are the eigenvalues. All eigenvalues are nonnegative because C is semidefinite. One can split
the matrix V into two parts,
(2.3) V = [V1, V2], where V1 ∈ Rn×r and V2 ∈ Rn×(n−r).
The subspace spanned by matrix V1 ∈ Rn×r is called an active subspace [45], because the
value of f(x) is very sensitive to perturbation vectors inside this subspace .
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Remark 2.1 (Relationships with the Principal Component Analysis). Given a set of data
X = [x1, . . . ,xm] with each column representing a data sample and each row is zero-mean,
the first principal component w1 inherits the maximal variance from X, namely,
(2.4) w1 = argmax
‖w‖2=1
m∑
i=1
(wT1 x
i)2 = argmax
‖w‖2=1
wTXXTw.
The variance is maximized whenw1 is the eigenvector associated with the largest eigenvalue of
XXT . The r-dimensional principal components are the first r eigenvectors associated with the
r largest eigenvalues of XXT . Note that the principal component analysis uses the covariance
matrix of input data sets X, but the active-subspace method uses the covariance matrix of
gradient ∇f(x). A perturbation along the direction w1 from the principal component analysis
does not necessarily cause a significantly change on the value of f(x).
The following lemma quantitatively describes that f(x) varies more on average along the
directions defined by the columns of V1 than along the directions defined by the columns of
V2.
Lemma 2.2. [10] Suppose f(x) is a continuous function and C is obtained from (2.1). For
the matrices V1 and V2 generated by (2.3), and the reduced vector
(2.5) z = VT1 x and z˜ = V
T
2 x,
it holds that
Ex[∇zf(x)T∇zf(x)] =λ1 + . . . + λr,
Ex[∇z˜f(x)T∇z˜f(x)] =λr+1 + . . .+ λn.(2.6)
Sketch of proof [10]:
Ex[∇zf(x)T∇zf(x)]
=trace
(
Ex[∇zf(x)∇zf(x)T ]
)
=trace
(
Ex[V
T
1∇xf(x)∇xf(x)TV1]
)
=trace
(
VT1CV1
)
=λ1 + . . .+ λr.
When λr+1, . . . , λn are all zero, Lemma 2.2 implies ∇z˜f(x) is zero everywhere. In this
case, f(x) is z-invariant. We may reduce x ∈ Rn to a low-dimensional vector z = VT1 x ∈ Rr
and construct a new response surface g(z) to represent f(x). In general, when λr+1, . . . , λn
are small, we may also construct a response surface g(z) to approximate f(x).
2.1. Response Surface. For a fixed z, the best guess for f is the conditional expectation
of f given z, i.e.,
(2.7) g(z) = Ez˜[f(x)|z] =
∫
f(V1z+V2z˜)ρ(z˜|z)dz˜.
Based on the Poincare´ inequality, the following approximation error bound can be obtained
under certain assumptions [10].
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Lemma 2.3. Assume that f(x) is absolutely continuous and square integrable with respect
to the probability density function ρ(x), then the approximation g(z) in (2.7) satisfies:
(2.8) E[(f(x)− g(z))2] ≤ const× (λr+1 + . . .+ λn).
Sketch of proof [10]:
Ex[(f(x)− g(z))2]
=Ez[Ez˜[(f(x)− g(z))2 |z]]
≤const× Ez[Ez˜[∇z˜f(x)T∇z˜f(x)|z]] (Poincare´ inequality)
=const× Ex[∇z˜f(x)T∇z˜f(x)]
=const× (λr+1 + . . .+ λn). (Lemma 2.2)
In other words, the active-subspace approximation error will be small if λr+1, . . . , λn are
negligible.
3. Active Subspace for Structural Analysis of Deep Neural Networks. This section
applies the active subspace to analyze the internal layers of a deep neural network in order
to reveal the number of important neurons at each layer. Afterwards, a new network called
ASNet is built to reduce the storage and computational complexity.
3.1. Deep Neural Networks. A deep neural network can be described as
(3.1) f(x0) = fL (fL−1 . . . (f1(x0))) ,
where x0 ∈ Rn0 is an input, L is the total number of layers, and fl : Rnl−1 → Rnl is a
function representing the l-th layer (e.g., combinations of convolution, fully connected, batch
normalization, ReLU, or pooling layers). For any 1 ≤ l ≤ L, we rewrite the above feed-forward
model as a superposition of functions, i.e.,
(3.2) f(x0) = fpost(fpre(x0)),
where the pre-model fpre(·) = fl . . . f1(·) denotes all operations before the l-th layer and
the post-model fpost(·) = fL . . . fl+1(·) denotes all succeeding operations. The intermediate
neuron x = fpre(x0) ∈ Rnl usually lies in a high dimension. We aim to study whether such a
high dimensionality is necessary. If not, how can we reduce it?
3.2. The Number of Active Neurons. Denote loss(·) as the loss function, and
(3.3) c(x) = loss(fpost(x)).
The covariance matrix C = E[∇c(x)∇c(x)T ] admits the eigenvalue decomposition C =
VΛVT with Λ = diag(λ1, · · · , λnl). We try to extract the active subspace of c(x) and reduce
the intermediate vector x to a small dimension.
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Definition 3.1. Suppose Λ is computed by (2.2). For any layer index 1 ≤ l ≤ L, we define
the number of active neurons nl,AS as follows:
(3.4) nl,AS = argmin
{
i :
√
λ1 + . . .+ λi√
λ1 + . . . + λnl
≥ 1− ǫ
}
,
where ǫ > 0 is a user-defined threshold.
Based on Definition 3.1, the post-model can be approximated by an nl,AS-dimensional
function with a high accuracy, i.e.,
(3.5) c(x) ≈ g(z) = Ez˜[c(x)|z].
Here z = VT1 x ∈ Rnl,AS plays the role of active neurons, z˜ = VT2 x ∈ Rn−nl,AS , and V =
[V1,V2].
Lemma 3.1. Suppose the input x0 is bounded, and consider a deep neural network with
the following operations: convolution, matrix-vector product, ReLU, batch normalization, and
max-pooling. Then for any l ∈ {1, . . . , L}, x = fpre(x0), and c(x) = loss(fpost(x)), the reduced
function g(z) defined in (3.5) satisfies
(3.6) E[(c(x)− g(z))2] = O(ǫ).
Proof. Denote c(x) = loss(fL(. . . (fl+1(x))), where loss(y) = − log exp(yb)∑c
i=1 exp(yi)
is the cross
entropy loss function, b is the true label, and c is the total number of classes. We first show
c(x) is absolutely continuous and square integrable, and then apply Lemma 2.3 to derive (3.6).
Firstly, all components of c(x) are Lipschitz continuous because (1) the convolution,
matrix-vector product, and batch normalization operations are all linear; (2) the max pool-
ing and ReLU functions are non-expansive. Here, a mapping m is non-expansive if ‖m(x) −
m(y)‖ ≤ ‖x− y‖; (3) the cross entropy loss function is smooth and gradient upper bounded,
i.e., ‖∇loss(y)‖ = ‖eb−exp(y)/
∑n
i=1 exp(yi)‖ ≤ n+1. The composition of two Lipschitz func-
tions will also be Lipschitz continuous: suppose the Lipschitz constants for f1 and f2 are α1
and α2, respectively, it holds that ‖f1(f2(x¯))−f1(f2(x))‖ ≤ α1‖f2(x¯)−f2(x)‖ ≤ α1α2‖x¯−x‖
for any vectors x¯ and x. By recursively applying the above rule, c(x) will be Lipschitz con-
tinuous:
‖c(x¯)− c(x)‖2 = ‖loss(fL(. . . (fl+1(x¯)))) − loss(fL(. . . (fl+1(x))))‖2
≤ αlossαL . . . αl+1‖x¯− x‖2.
The intermediate neuron x is in a bounded domain because the input x0 is bounded and all
functions fi(·) are either continuous or non-expansive. Based on the fact that any Lipschitz-
continuous function is also absolutely continuous on a compact domain [44], we conclude that
c(x) is absolutely continuous.
Secondly, because x is bounded and c(x) is continuous, both c(x) and its square integral
will be bounded, i.e.,
∫
c2(x)ρ(x)dx <∞.
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Algorithm 3.1 The training procedure of the active subspace network (ASNet)
Input: A pretrained deep neural network, the layer index l, and the number of active
neurons r.
Step 1 Initialize the active subspace layer. The active subspace layer is a linear projec-
tion where the projection matrix V1 ∈ Rn×r is computed by Algorithm 3.2. If r is not
given, we use r = nAS defined in (3.4) by default.
Step 2 Initialize the polynomial chaos expansion layer. The polynomial chaos expan-
sion layer is a nonlinear mapping from the reduced active subspace to the outputs, as
shown in (3.10). The weights cα is computed by (3.12).
Step 3 Construct the ASNet. Combine the pre-model (the first l layers of the deep neural
network) with the active subspace and polynomial chaos expansion layers as a new
network, referred to as ASNet.
Step 4 Fine-tuning. Retrain ASNet for several epochs by the stochastic gradient descent.
Output: A new network ASNet
Finally, by Lemma 2.3, it holds that
E[(c(x)− g(z))2] ≤ α(λnl,AS+1 + . . .+ λn) = O(ǫ).
The proof is completed.
The above lemma shows that the active subspace method can be used to reduce the
number of neurons of the l-th layer from nl to nl,AS.
3.3. Active Subspace Network (ASNet). This subsection proposes a new network called
ASNet that can reduce both the storage and computational cost. Given a deep neural network,
we first choose a proper layer l and project the high-dimensional intermediate neurons to a low-
dimensional vector in the active subspace. Afterwards, the post-model is deleted completely
and replaced with a nonlinear model that maps the low-dimensional active feature vector to
the output directly. This new network is called as ASNet, and it has three parts:
(1) Pre-model: the pre-model includes the first l layers of a deep neural network.
(2) Active subspace layer: a linear projection from the intermediate neurons to the
low-dimensional active subspace.
(3) Polynomial chaos expansion layer: the polynomial chaos expansion [20, 53] maps
the active-subspace variables to the output.
The whole procedure is illustrated in Fig. 2 (b) and Algorithm 3.1.
3.4. The Active Subspace Layer. Given a dataset D = {x1, . . . ,xm}, the empirical co-
variance matrix is computed by Cˆ = 1
m
∑m
i=1∇c(xi)∇c(xi)T . Instead of calculating the
eigenvalue decomposition of Cˆ, we compute the singular value decomposition of Gˆ:
(3.7) Gˆ = [∇c(x1), . . . ,∇c(xm)] = VˆΣˆUˆT ∈ Rnl×m with Σˆ = diag(σˆ1, · · · , σˆnl).
The eigenvectors of C is approximated by the left singular vectors Vˆ and the eigenvalues of
C is approximated by the singular values of Gˆ, i.e., Λ ≈ Σˆ2.
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layer 1 layer 2 ... layer L
(a) A deep neural network
pre-model AS PCE
(b) The proposed ASNet
Figure 2: (a) The original deep neural network; (b) The proposed ASNet with three parts: a
pre-model, an active subspace (AS) layer, and a polynomial chaos expansion (PCE) layer.
Algorithm 3.2 The frequent direction algorithm for computing the active subspace
Input: A dataset with MAS input samples {xj0}MASj=1 , a pre-model fpre(·), a subroutine for
computing ∇c(x), and the dimension of truncated singular value decomposition r.
1: Select r samples xi0, compute x
i = fpre(x
i
0), and construct an initial matrix S ←
[∇c(x1), . . . ,∇c(xr)].
2: for t=1, 2, . . . , do
3: Compute the singular value decomposition VΣUT ← svd(S), where Σ =
diag(σ1, . . . , σr).
4: If the maximal number of samples is reached, stop.
5: Update S by the soft-thresholding (3.8).
6: Get a new sample xnew0 , compute x
new = fpre(x
new
0 ), and replace the last column of S
(now all zeros) by the gradient vector S(:, r)← ∇c(xnew).
7: end for
Output: The projection matrix V ∈ Rnl×r and the singular values Σ ∈ Rr×r.
We use the memory-saving frequent direction method [21] to compute the r dominant
singular value components, i.e., Gˆ ≈ VˆrΣˆrUˆTr . Here r is much smaller than the total number
of samples. The frequent direction approach only stores an n× r matrix S. In the beginning,
each column of S ∈ Rn×r is initialized by a gradient vector. Then the randomized singular
value decomposition [24] is used to generate S = UΣVT . Afterwards, S is updated in the
following way,
(3.8) S← V
√
Σ2 − σ2r .
Now the last column of S are all zeros and will be replaced with the gradient vector of a new
sample. By repeating this process, SST will approximate GˆGˆT with a high accuracy and
V will approximate the left singular vectors of Gˆ. The algorithm framework is presented in
Algorithm 3.2.
After obtaining Σ = diag(σ1, . . . , σr), we can approximate the number of active neurons
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as
(3.9) nˆl,AS = argmin

i :
√
σ21 + . . . + σ
2
i√
σ21 + . . . + σ
2
r
≥ 1− ǫ

 .
Under the condition that σ2i → λi for i = 1, . . . , r and λr → 0 for i = r + 1, . . . , nl, (3.9) can
approximate nl,AS in (3.4) with a high accuracy. Further, the projection matrix Vˆ1 is chosen
as the first nˆl,AS columns of V.
3.5. Polynomial Chaos Expansion Layer. After obtaining the reduced variables z, we
construct a new surrogate model to approximate the post-model of a deep neural network.
This problem can be regarded as an uncertainty quantification problem if we see z as a random
vector.
By the polynomial chaos expansion [52], the network output y ∈ Rc is approximated by a
linear combination of some orthogonal polynomial basis functions:
(3.10) yˆ ≈
p∑
|α|=0
cαφα(z), where |α| = α1 + . . .+ αd.
Here φα(z) is a multivariate polynomial basis function chosen based on the probability den-
sity function of z. When the parameters z = [z1, . . . , zr]
T are independent, both the joint
density function and the multi-variable basis function can be decomposed into products of
one-dimensional functions, i.e., ρ(z) = ρ1(z1) . . . ρr(zr), φα(z) = φα1(z1)φα2(z2) . . . φαr(zr).
The marginal basis function φαj (zj) is uniquely determined by the marginal density function
ρi(zi). The scatter plot in Fig. 3 shows that the marginal probability density of each vari-
able zi in a deep neural network is close to a Gaussian distribution. Suppose ρi(zi) follows a
Gaussian distribution, then φαj (zj) will be a Hermite polynomial [34], i.e.,
(3.11) φ0(z) = 1, φ1(z) = z, φ2(z) = 4z
2 − 2, φp+1(z) = 2zφp(z)− 2pφp−1(z).
In a general setting, the elements in z can be non-Gaussian correlated. In this case, the basis
functions {φα(z)} can be built via the Gram-Schmidt approach described in [13].
The coefficient cα can be computed by a linear least-square optmization. Denote z
j =
VˆT1 fpre(x
j
0) as the random samples and y
j as the network output for j = 1, . . . ,MPCE. The
coefficient vector cα can be computed by
(3.12) min
cα
MPCE∑
j=1

yj − p∑
|α|=0
cαφα(z
j)


2
.
Based on the Nyquist-Shannon sampling theorem, the number of samples to train cα needs
to satisfy MPCE ≥ 2Nbasis = 2
(
r+p
p
)
. However, this number can be reduced to a smaller set of
“important” samples by the D-optimal design [56] or the sparse regularization approach [14].
The polynomial chaos expansion builds a surrogate model to approximate the deep neural
network output y. This idea is similar to the knowledge distillation [28], where a pre-trained
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Figure 3: Distribution of the first two active subspace variables at the 6-th layer of VGG-19 for
CIFAR-10.
teacher network teaches a smaller student network to learn the output feature. However, our
polynomial-chaos layer uses one nonlinear projection whereas the knowledge distillation uses
a series of layers. Therefore, the polynomial chaos expansion is more efficient in terms of
computational and storage cost.
3.6. Structured Re-training of ASNet. The pre-model can be further compressed by
various techniques such as network pruning and sharing [25], low-rank factorization [40, 33, 18],
or data quantization [15, 12]. Denote θ as the weights in ASNet and {xi0,yi}mi=1 as the training
dataset. We re-train the network by solving the following regularized optimization problem:
(3.13) θ∗ = argmin
θ
1
m
m∑
i=1
loss(f(θ;xi0,y
i)) + λR(θ).
Here (xi0,y
i) is a training sample,m is the total number of training samples, loss(·) is the cross-
entropy loss function, R(θ) is a regularization function, and λ is a regularization parameter.
Different regularization functions can result in different model structures. For instance, an
ℓ1 regularizer R(θ) = ‖θ‖1 [2, 47, 54] will return a sparse weight, an ℓ1,2-norm regularizer
will result in a column-wise sparse weights, a nuclear norm regularizer will result in low-rank
weights. At each iteration, we solve (3.13) by a stochastic proximal gradient decent algorithm
[50]
(3.14) θk+1 = argmax
θ
(θ − θk)Tgk + 1
2αk
‖θ − θk‖22 + λR(Θ).
Here gk = 1|Bk|
∑
i∈Bk
∇θloss(f(θ;xi0,yi)) is the stochastic gradient, Bk is a batch at the k-th
step, and αk is the stepsize.
In this work, we chose the ℓ1 regularization to get sparse weight matrices. In this case,
problem (3.14) has a closed-form solution:
(3.15) θk+1 = Sαkλ(θk − αkgk),
where Sλ(x) = xmax(0, 1 − λ/|x|) is a soft-thresholding operator.
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Figure 4: Perturbations along the directions of an active-subspace direction and of principal compo-
nent, respectively. (a) The function f(x) = aTx − b. (b) The perturbed function along the active-
subspace direction. (c) The perturbed function along the principal component analysis direction.
4. Active-Subspace for Universal Adversarial Attacks. This section investigates how
to generate a universal adversarial attack by the active-subspace method. Given a smooth
function f(x), the maximal perturbation direction is defined by
(4.1) v∗δ = argmax
‖v‖2≤δ
Ex[(f(x+ v)− f(x))2].
Here, δ is a user-defined perturbation upper bound. By the first order Taylor expansion, we
have f(x+ v) ≈ f(x) +∇f(x)Tv, and problem (4.1) can be reduced to
(4.2) vAS = argmax
‖v‖2=1
Ex[(∇f(x)Tv)2] = argmax
‖v‖2=1
vTEx[∇f(x)∇f(x)T ]v.
The vector vAS is exactly the dominant eigenvector of the covariance matrix of ∇f(x). The
solution for (4.1) can be approximated by +δvAS or −δvAS . Here, both vAS and −vAS are
solutions of (4.2) but their effect on (4.1) are different.
Example 4.1. Consider a two-dimensional function f(x) = aTx− b with a = [1,−1]T and
b = 1 in a two-dimensional square domain x ∈ [0, 1]2, as shown in Fig. 4 (a). It follows
from ∇f(x) = a that the covariance matrix C = aaT . The dominant eigenvector of C or
the active-subspace direction is vAS = a/‖a‖2 = [1/
√
2,−1/√2]. We apply vAS to perturb
f(x) and plot f(x+ δvAS) in Fig. 4 (b), which shows a significant difference even for a small
permutation δ = 0.3. Furthermore, we plot the perturbed function along the first principal
component direction w1 = [1/
√
2, 1/
√
2]T in Fig. 4 (c). However, w1 does not result in any
perturbation because aTw1 = 0. This example indicates the difference between the active-
subspace and principal component analysis: the active-subspace direction can capture the
sensitivity information of f(x) whereas the principal component is independent of f(x).
4.1. Universal Perturbation of Deep Neural Networks. Given a dataset D and a classifi-
cation function j(x) that maps an input sample to an output label. The universal perturbation
seeks for a vector v∗ whose norm is upper bounded by δ, such that the class label can be per-
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turbed with a high probability, i.e.,
(4.3) v∗ = argmax
‖v‖≤δ
prob
x∈D[j(x+ v) 6= j(x)] = argmax
‖v‖≤δ
Ex[1j(x+v)6=j(x)],
where 1d equals one if the condition d is satisfied and zero otherwise. Solving problem (4.3)
directly is challenging because both 1d and j(x) are discontinuous. By replacing j(x) by with
the loss function c(x) = loss(f(x)) and the indicator function 1d with a quadratic function,
we reformulate problem (4.3) as
(4.4) max
v
Ex[(c(x+ v)− c(x))2] s.t. ‖v‖2 ≤ δ.
The ball-constrained optimization problem (4.4) can be solved by various numerical tech-
niques such as the spectral gradient descent method [6] and the limited-memory projected
quasi-Newton [48]. However, these methods can only guarantee convergence to a local sta-
tionary point. Instead, we are interested in computing a direction that can achieve a better
objective value by a heuristic algorithm.
4.2. Recursive Projection Method. Using the first order Taylor expansion c(x + v) ≈
c(x) + vT∇c(x), we reformulate problem (4.4) as a ball constrained quadratic problem
(4.5) max
v
vTEx[∇c(x)∇c(x)T ]v s.t. ‖v‖2 ≤ δ.
Problem (4.5) is easy to solve because its closed-form solution is exactly the dominant eigen-
vector of the covariance matrix C = Ex[∇c(x)∇c(x)T ] or the first active-subspace direction.
However, the dominant eigenvector in (4.5) may not be efficient because c(x) is nonlinear.
Therefore, we compute v recursively by
(4.6) vk+1 = proj(vk + skdvk),
where proj(v) = v ×min(1, δ/‖v‖2), sk is the stepsize, and dvk is approximated by
(4.7) dvk = argmax
dv
dvTEx
[
∇c
(
x+ vk
)
∇c
(
x+ vk
)T]
dv s.t. ‖dv‖2 ≤ 1.
Namely, dvk is the dominant eigenvector of Ck = Ex
[
∇c (x+ vk)∇c (x+ vk)T ]. Because
dvk is the direction that maximizes the changes in Ex[(c(x+v+ dv)− c(x+v))2], we expect
that the attack ratio keeps increasing, i.e., r(vk+1;D) ≥ r(vk;D), where
(4.8) r(v;D) = 1|D|
∑
x
i∈D
1j(xi+v)6=j(xi).
The backtracking line search approach [3] is employed to choose sk such that the attack ratio
of vk + skdvk is higher than the attack ratio of both vk and vk − skdvk, i.e.,
(4.9) sk = min
i
{ski,t : r(vk+1i,t ;D) > max(r(vk+1i,−t ;D), r(vk;D)},
where ski,t = (−1)ts0γi, t ∈ {1,−1}, s0 is the initial stepsize, γ < 1 is the decrease ratio, and
vk+1i,t = proj(v
k + sk+1i,t dv
k). If such a stepsize sk exists, we update vk+1 by (4.6) and repeat
the process. Otherwise, we record the number of failures and stop the algorithm when the
failure time is greater than a threshold.
The overall flow is summarized in Algorithm 4.1.
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Algorithm 4.1 Recursive Active Subspace Universal Attack
Input: A pre-trained deep neural network denoted as c(x), a classification oracle j(x), a
training dataset D0, an upper bound for the attack vector δ, an initial stepsize s0, a decrease
ratio γ < 1, and the parameter in the stopping criterion α.
1: Initialize the attack vector as v0 = 0.
2: for k = 0, 1, . . . do
3: Select the training dataset as D = {xi + vk : xi ∈ D0 and j(xi + vk) = j(xi)}, then
compute the dominate active subspace direction dv by Algorithm 3.2.
4: for i = 0, 1, ...I do
5: Let ski,± = (−1)±s0γi and vk+1i,± = proj(vk + sk+1i,± dvk) . Compute the attack ratios
r(vk+1i,1 ) and r(v
k+1
i,−1) by (4.8).
6: If either r(vk+1i,1 ) or r(v
k+1
i,−1) is greater than r(v
k), stop the process. Return sk =
(−1)tski,1, where t = 1 if r(vk+1i,1 ) ≥ r(vk+1i,−1) and t = −1 otherwise.
7: end for
If no stepsize sk is returned, let sk = s0r
I and record this step as a failure. Compute
the next iteration vk+1 by the projection (4.6).
8: If the number of failure is greater than a threshold, stop.
9: end for
Output: The universal active adversarial attack vector vAS.
5. Numerical Experiments. In this section, we show the power of active-subspace in
revealing the number of active neurons, compressing neural networks, and computing the
universal adversarial perturbation direction. All codes are implemented in PyTorch and are
available online2.
5.1. Structural Analysis and Compression. We test the ASNet constructed by Algo-
rithm 3.1, where the polynomial order is p = 2, the number of active neurons is set as r = 50,
and the threshold in Equation (3.4) is set as ǫ = 0.05. We re-train ASNet by the knowl-
edge distillation [28] if necessary and seek for the sparse weights in ASNet-s by the convex
optimization method in Section 3.6. In all figures and tables, the numbers in the bracket of
ASNet(·) or ASNet-s(·) indicate the index of a cut-off layer. We report the performance for
different cut-off layers in terms of accuracy, storage, and computational complexities.
5.1.1. Efficiency of Active-subspace. We first show the effectiveness of ASNet construc-
ted by Steps 1-3 of Algorithm 3.1 without fine-tuning. We investigate the following three
properties. (1) Redundancy of neurons. The distributions of the first 200 singular values
of the matrix Gˆ [defined in (3.7)] are plotted in Fig. 5 (a). The singular values decrease
almost exponentially for layers l ∈ {4, 5, 6, 7}. Although the total numbers of neurons are
8192, 16384, 16384, and 16384, the numbers of active neurons are only 105, 84, 54, and 36,
respectively. (2) Redundancy of the layers. We cut off the deep neuralwork at an inter-
mediate layer and replace the subsequent layers with one simple logistic regression [29]. As
shown by the red bar in Fig. 5 (b), the logistic regression can achieve relatively high accuracy.
2https://github.com/chunfengc/ASNet
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Figure 5: Structural analysis of VGG-19 on the CIFAR-10 dataset. (a) The first 200 singular values
for layers 4 ≤ l ≤ 7; (b) The accuracy (without any fine-tuning) obtained by active-subspace (AS) and
polynomial chaos expansions (PCE) compared with principal component analysis (PCA) and logistic
regression (LR).
Table 1: Accuracy and storage of ASNet on VGG-19 for CIFAR-10.
Network Accuracy Storage (MB) Flops (106)
VGG-19 93.28% 76.45 398.14
Pre-M AS+PCE Overall Pre-M AS+PCE Overall
ASNet(5) 91.46% 2.12 3.18 5.30 115.02 0.83 115.85
(23.41×) (14.43×) (340.11×) (3.44×)
ASNet-s(5) 90.40% 1.14 2.05 3.19 54.03 0.54 54.56
(1.86×) (36.33×) (23.98×) (2.13×) (527.91×) (7.30×)
ASNet(6) 92.87% 4.38 3.18 7.55 152.76 0.83 153.60
(22.70×) (10.12×) (294.76×) (2.59×)
ASNet-s(6) 91.08% 1.96 1.81 3.77 67.37 0.48 67.85
(2.24×) (39.73×) (20.27×) (2.27×) (515.98×) (5.87×)
ASNet(7) 93.31% 6.63 3.18 9.80 190.51 0.83 191.35
(21.99×) (7.80×) (249.41×) (2.08×)
ASNet-s(7) 90.87% 2.61 1.91 4.52 80.23 0.50 80.73
(2.54×) (36.64×) (16.92×) (2.37×) (415.68×) (4.93×)
This verifies that the features trained from the first few layers already have a high expres-
sion power since replacing all subsequent layers with a simple expression loses little accuracy.
(3) Efficiency of the active-subspace and polynomial chaos expansion. We compare
the proposed active-subspace layer with the principal component analysis [30] in projecting
the high-dimensional neuron to a low-dimensional space, and also compare the polynomial
chaos expansion layer with logistic regression in terms of their efficiency to extract class labels
from the low-dimensional variables. Fig. 5 (b) shows that the combination of active-subspace
and polynomial chaos expansion can achieve the best accuracy.
5.1.2. CIFAR-10. We continue to present the results of ASNet and ASNet-s on CIFAR-
10 by two widely used networks: VGG-19 and ResNet-110 in Tables 1 and 2, respectively.
The second column shows the testing accuracy for the corresponding network. We report
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Table 2: Accuracy and storage on ResNet-110 for CIFAR-10.
Network Accuracy Storage (MB) Flops (106)
ResNet-110 93.78% 6.59 252.89
Pre-M AS+PCE Overall Pre-M AS+PCE Overall
ASNet(61) 89.56% 1.15 1.61 2.77 140.82 0.42 141.24
(3.37×) (2.38×) (265.03×) (1.79×)
ASNet-s(61) 89.26% 0.83 1.23 2.06 104.05 0.32 104.37
(1.39×) (4.41×) (3.19×) (1.35×) (346.82×) (2.42×)
ASNet(67) 90.16% 1.37 1.61 2.98 154.98 0.42 155.40
(3.24×) (2.21×) (231.55×) (1.63×)
ASNet-s(67) 89.69% 1.00 1.22 2.22 116.38 0.32 116.70
(1.36×) (4.29×) (2.97×) (1.33×) (306.72×) (2.17×)
ASNet(73) 90.48% 1.58 1.61 3.19 169.13 0.42 169.55
(3.11×) (2.06×) (198.07×) (1.49×)
ASNet-s(73) 90.02% 1.18 1.16 2.34 128.65 0.30 128.96
(1.34×) (4.32×) (2.82×) (1.31×) (275.74×) (1.96×)
Table 3: Accuracy and storage on VGG-19 for CIFAR-100.
Network Top1 Top5 Storage (MB) Flops (106)
VGG-19 71.90% 89.57% 76.62 398.18
Pre-M AS+PCE Overall Pre-M AS+PCE Overall
ASNet(7) 70.77% 91.05% 6.63 3.63 10.26 190.51 0.83 191.35
(19.23×) (7.45×) (249.41×) (2.08×)
ASNet-s(7) 70.20% 90.90% 5.20 3.24 8.44 144.81 0.85 145.66
(1.27×) (21.56×) (9.06×) (1.32×) (244.57×) (2.73×)
ASNet(8) 69.50% 90.15% 8.88 1.29 10.17 228.26 0.22 228.48
(52.50×) (7.52×) (779.04×) (1.74×)
ASNet-s(8) 69.17% 89.73% 6.87 1.22 8.09 172.69 0.32 173.01
(1.29×) (55.36×) (9.45×) (1.32×) (530.92×) (2.30×)
ASNet(9) 72.00% 90.61% 13.39 2.07 15.46 247.14 0.42 247.56
(30.49×) (4.95×) (357.10×) (1.61×)
ASNet-s(9) 71.38% 90.28% 9.38 1.94 11.32 183.27 0.51 183.78
(1.43×) (32.49×) (6.75×) (1.35×) (296.74×) (2.17×)
the storage and computational costs for the pre-model, post-model (i.e., active-subspace plus
polynomial chaos expansion for ASNet and ASNet-s), and overall results, respectively. For
both examples, ASNet and ASNet-s can achieve a similar accuracy with the teacher network
yet with much smaller storage and computational cost. For VGG-19, ASNet achieves 14.43×
storage savings and 3.44× computational reduction; ASNet-s achieves 23.98× storage savings
and 7.30× computational reduction. For most ASNet and ASNet-s networks, the storage
and computational costs of the post-models achieve significant performance boosts by our
proposed network structure changes. It is not surprising to see that increasing the layer index
(i.e., cutting off the deep neural network at a later layer) can produce a higher accuracy.
5.1.3. CIFAR-100. Next, we present the results of VGG-19 and ResNet-110 on CIFAR-
100 in Tables 3 and 4, respectively. On VGG-19, ASNet can achieve 7.45× storage savings
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Table 4: Accuracy and storage on ResNet-110 for CIFAR-100.
Network Top-1 Top-5 Storage (MB) Flops (106)
ResNet-110 71.94% 91.71 % 6.61 252.89
Pre-M AS+PCE Overall Pre-M AS+PCE Overall
ASNet(75) 63.01% 88.55% 1.79 1.29 3.08 172.67 0.22 172.89
(3.73×) (2.14×) (367.88×) (1.46×)
ASNet-s(75) 63.16% 88.65% 1.47 1.20 2.67 143.11 0.31 143.42
(1.22×) (3.99×) (2.46×) (1.21×) (254.69×) (1.76×)
ASNet(81) 65.82% 90.02% 2.64 1.29 3.93 186.83 0.22 187.04
(3.07×) (1.68×) (302.96×) (1.35×)
ASNet-s(81) 65.73% 89.95% 2.20 1.21 3.41 155.61 0.32 155.93
(1.20×) (3.27×) (1.93×) (1.20×) (208.38×) (1.62×)
ASNet(87) 67.71% 90.17% 3.48 1.29 4.77 200.98 0.22 201.20
(2.41×) (1.38×) (238.04×) (1.26×)
ASNet-s(87) 67.65% 90.10% 2.91 1.21 4.12 166.50 0.32 166.81
(1.20×) (2.56×) (1.60×) (1.21×) (163.50×) (1.52×)
and 2.08× computational reduction, and ASNet-s can achieve 9.06× storage savings and
2.73× computational reduction. The accuracy loss is negligible for VGG-19 but larger for
ResNet-110. Note that the performance boost of ASNet is obtained by just changing the
network structures and without any model compression (e.g., pruning, quantization, or low-
rank factorization).
5.2. Universal Adversarial Attacks. This subsection demonstrate the effectiveness of
active-subspace in identifying a universal adversarial attack vector. We denote the result
generated by Algorithm 4.1 as “AS” and compare it with the “UAP” method in [37] and
with “random” Gaussian distribution vector. The parameters in Algorithm 4.1 are set as
α = 10 and δ = 5, . . . , 10. The default parameters of UAP are applied except for the maximal
iteration. In the code implementation of [37], the maximal iteration is set as infinity, which
is time-consuming when the training dataset or the number of classes is large. In our exper-
iments, we set the maximal iteration as 10. In all figures and tables, we report the average
attack ratio and CPU time in training out of ten repeated experiments with different training
datasets. A higher attack ratio means the corresponding algorithm is better in fooling the
given deep neural network. The datasets are chosen in two ways. We firstly test data points
from one class (e.g., trousers in Fashion-MNIST) because these data points share lots of com-
mon features and have a higher probability to be attacked by a universal perturbation vector.
We then conduct experiments on the whole dataset to show our proposed algorithm can also
provide good results even if the dataset has very diverse features.
5.2.1. Fashion-MNIST. Firstly, we present the adversarial attack result on Fashion-
MNIST by a 4-layer neural network. There are two convolutional layers with kernel size
equals 5×5. The size of output channels for each convolutional layer is 20 and 50, respec-
tively. Each convolutional layer is followed by a ReLU activation layer and a max-pooling layer
with a kernel size of 2 × 2. There are two fully connected layers. The first fully connected
layer has an input feature 800 and output feature 500.
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Figure 6: Universal adversarial attacks for the Fashion-MINST with respect to different ℓ2-norms.
(a)-(c): the results for attacking one class dataset. (d)-(f): the results for attacking the whole dataset.
Fig. 6 presents the attack ratio of our active-subspace method compared with the baselines
UAP method [37] and a Gaussian random vector. The top figures show the results fon just one
class of data (i.e., trouser), and the bottom figures shows the results for all ten classes. For all
perturbation norms, the active-subspace method can achieve around 30% higher attack ratio
than UAP while more than 10 times faster. This verifies that the active-subspace method
has better universal representation ability compared with UAP because the active-subspace
can find a universal direction while UAP solves data-dependent subproblems independently.
By the active-subspace approach, almost 100% of data points in the first class dataset can be
attacked and around 75% for the whole dataset. This coincides with our intuition that the
data points in one class have higher similarity than data points from different classes.
In Fig. 7, we plot one image from Fashion-MNIST and its perturbation by the active-
subspace attack vector. The attacked image in Fig. 7 (c) still looks like a trouser for a human.
However, the deep neural network misclassifies it as a t-shirt/top.
5.2.2. CIFAR-10. Next, we show the numerical results of attacking VGG-19 on the data
set CIFAR-10. Fig. 8 compares the active-subspace method compared with the baseline UAP
and a Gaussian random vector. The top figures show the results by the dataset in the first
class (i.e., automobile), and the bottom figures shows the results for all ten classes. For both
two cases, the proposed active-subspace attack can achieve 20% higher attack ratios. and it
is three times faster than UAP. This is similar to the results in Fashion-MNIST because the
active-subspace has a better ability to capture the global information.
We further show the effects of different number of training samples in Fig. 9. When the
number of samples is increased, the testing attack ratio is getting better and better. In our
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Figure 7: The effect of our attack method on one data sample in the Fashion-MNIST dataset. (a) A
trouser from the original dataset. (b) An active-subspace perturbation vector with the ℓ2 norm equals
to 5. (c) The perturbed sample is misclassified as a t-shirt/top by the deep neural network.
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Figure 8: Universal adversarial attacks of VGG-19 on CIFAR-10 with respect to different ℓ2-norm
perturbations. (a)-(c): The training attack ratio, the testing attack ratio, and the CPU time in seconds
for attacking one class dataset. (d)-(f): The results for attacking ten classes dataset together.
numerical experiments, we set the number of samples as 100 for one-class experiments and
200 for all-classes experiments. We continue to show the cross-model performance on four
different ResNet networks and one VGG network. We test the performance of the attack
vector trained from one model on all models. Each row in Table 5 shows the results on the
same deep neural network and each column shows the results of the same attack vector. It
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Figure 9: Adversarial attack of VGG-19 on CIFAR-10 with different number of training samples. The
ℓ2-norm perturbation is fixed as 10. (a) The results of attacking the dataset from the first class; (b)
The results of attacking the whole dataset with 10 classes.
Table 5: Cross-model performance for CIFAR-10
ResNet-20 ResNet-44 ResNet-56 ResNet-110 VGG-19
ResNet-20 91.35% 87.74% 86.28% 87.38% 81.16%
ResNet-44 84.75% 92.28% 87.03% 85.44% 83.44%
ResNet-56 83.63% 86.67% 90.15% 87.39% 84.38%
ResNet-110 71.02% 77.58% 74.19% 92.77% 77.32%
VGG-19 53.61% 59.74% 61.49% 66.29% 80.02%
shows that ResNet-20 is easier to attack than other models, which agrees with our intuition
that the structure of ResNet-20 is simple. On the contrary, VGG-19 is the most robust. The
success of cross-model attacks indicate that these neural networks could find a similar feature.
5.2.3. CIFAR-100. Finally, we show the results on CIFAR-100 for both the first class (i.e.,
dolphin) and all classes. Similar to Fashion-MNIST and CIFAR-10, Fig. 10 shows that active-
subspace can achieve higher attack ratios than both UAP and a random Gaussian vector.
Further, compared with CIFAR-10, CIFAR-100 is easier to be attacked partially because it
has more classes.
We summarize the results for different datasets in Table 6. The second column shows the
number of classes in the dataset. In terms of testing attack ratio for the whole dataset, active-
subspace achieves 24.2%, 15%, and 6.1% higher attack ratios than UAP for Fashion-MNIST,
CIFAR-10, and CIFAR-100, respectively. In terms of the CPU time, active-subspace achieves
42×, 5×, and 14× speedup than UAP on the Fashion-MNIST, CIFAR-10, and CIFAR-100,
respectively.
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Figure 10: Results for universal adversarial attack for CIFAR-100 with respect to different ℓ2-norm
perturbations. (a)-(c): The results for attacking the dataset from the first class. (d)-(f): The results
for attacking ten classes dataset together.
Table 6: Summary of the universal attack for different datasets by the active-subspace compared with
UAP and the random vector. The norm of perturbation is equal to 10.
Training Attack ratio Testing Attack ratio CPU time (s)
# Class AS UAP Rand AS UAP Rand AS UAP
Fashion- 1 100.0% 93.6% 1.8% 98.0% 91.3% 3.0% 0.15 5.49
MNIST 10 79.2% 51.5% 8.0% 73.3% 49.1% 12.3% 1.40 58.85
CIFAR-10
1 94.7% 79.8% 8.0% 84.5% 57.9% 10.6% 8.18 52.83
10 86.5% 65.9% 10.2% 74.9% 59.9% 17.0% 37.01 181.72
CIFAR-100
1 97.2% 87.9% 19.7% 92.1% 84.3% 37.9% 13.32 248.78
100 93.7% 86.5% 38.7% 83.5% 77.4% 52.0% 14.32 204.50
6. Conclusions. This paper has proposed to analyze deep neural networks by the active
subspace method originally developed for dimensionality reduction and uncertainty quantifi-
cation. We have investigated two problems: how many neurons and layers are necessary (or
important) in a deep neural network, and how to generate a universal adversarial attack vector
that can be applied to a set of testing data? Firstly, we have presented a definition of “the
number of active neurons” and have shown its theoretical error bounds for model reduction.
Our numerical study has shown that many neurons and layers are not needed. Based on this
observation, we have proposed a new network called ASNet by cutting off the whole neural
network at a proper layer and replacing all subsequent layers with an active subspace layer
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and a polynomial chaos expansion layer. The numerical experiments show that the proposed
deep neural network structural analysis method can produce a new network with significant
storage savings and computational speedup yet with little accuracy loss. Our methods can be
combined with existing model compression techniques (e.g., pruning, quantization and low-
rank factorization) to develop compact deep neural network models that are more suitable
for the deployment on resource-constrained platforms. Secondly, we have applied the active
subspace to generate a universal attack vector that is independent of a specific data sample
and can be applied to a whole dataset. Our proposed method can achieve a much higher
attack ratio than the existing work [37] and enjoys a lower computational cost.
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